We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. A variety of recent models gives the same predictions for this game. This allows us to provide a general classification of individuals' types. Contrary to a large number of studies on different games over the last decade, we observe a large group of subjects behaving in a selfinterested and rational way in the Hawk-Dove game.
Introduction
Economic theory traditionally assumed that agents only care about their own material well-being.
Over the last decade, however, an abundance of evidence has appeared, showing that fairness and/or reciprocity considerations also play an important role in individual behavior (for a survey, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2003) . To a large extent this has been based on laboratory experiments, many of which study behavior in bargaining, gift-exchange or public -good contribution games. In this note, we experimentally study both fairness and reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove game. In some respects, this game may be considered to be more competitive than the games previously used. We test for the occurrence of both positive and negative reciprocity in this game. To do so, we elicit conditional strategies using the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism.
There are two approaches to fairness and reciprocity in the literature. The 'outcome-approach' assumes that people are concerned about the final distribution of income between themselves and fellow players (e.g., Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) . In this view, a player may take costly actions to bring about a more equal income distribution. The 'process-approach' focuses on players' attitudes towards the process yielding the distribution of incomes (e.g., Rabin, 1993 , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998 , Falk and Fischbacher, 1999 , Charness and Rabin, 2002 .
Actions are evaluated on the basis of what the player could alternatively have done (but did not do).
For our game a player is predicted to behave the same way, irrespective of whether fairness or reciprocity is the driving force or whether preferences are outcome-or process-oriented.
Moreover, her behavior and preferences will be different from those of a player with no other regarding preferences. Our main result is that most subjects revealed self-interested preferences and behaved in a money-maximizing manner.
The Hawk-Dove game
The extensive form of the game considered is given in Figure 1 . One interpretation is that wo players have to divide a pie of size one (Poulsen, 2001) . Decisions are simultaneous: if both play action D (Dove), the pie is split equally. If one player plays D and the other H (Hawk), the pie is split unequally, with the hawk-player taking three quarters. Finally, if both play H (i.e., disagreement) neither gets a share and monetary payoffs are zero.
If the players only care about material payoffs, the game has two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (D,H) and (H,D), with an unequal split, and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player mixes between D and H with equal probabilities.
We distinguish between the following player types: As an illustration of a way to include a notion of fairness or reciprocity into the game, consider Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model, in which inequity averse players appear.
1 The utility function of player i={1,2} is:
where x i (x j ) denotes the payoff to player i (j), i,j={1,2}, i≠j. A difference in monetary payoffs decreases utility, the disutility being relatively greater if disadvantageous (x i <x j ) than if advantageous (x i >x j ). The (utility) payoffs of the Hawk-Dove game with Fehr/Schmidt preferences are given in figure 1. The model immediately accounts for three of the player types distinguished above. For α,β<0.5, the M-type emerges; α>0.5, β<0.5 gives the H-type and α>β>0.5 yields the R-type.
Finally, though Fehr and Schmidt disregard altruistic preferences (i.e., α i <β i .), allowing such preferences is a straightforward extension. If β>α>0.5, the model once again gives the R-type, and for α<0.5, β>0.5, the model describes the preferences of the D-type. [(H,H)] is the unique pure strategy equilibrium.
1 Similarly, one could apply other models to the game. We apply Fehr and Schmidt's model as an example because a straightforward link exists between its parameter space and the types we distinguish. Most of the models on fairness and/or reciprocity can accommodate at least some of our types. Fehr and Schmidt adopt the outcome-approach to fairness and reciprocity. As for the process-approaches, precise predictions are quite involved due to the general structure of these models. They generally support the R-type, however: individuals who perceive H (D) as a hostile (friendly) action will respond to it with H (D).
Hence, both approaches work in the same direction in this game. Specifically, all models can account for the existence of R-types. This makes the Hawk-Dove game an ideal candidate for the purpose of studying the role of reciprocity without needing to choose a particular model of it. Moreover, the game is related to other games that have been used to study reciprocity, in a straightforward way.
Below, we will compare our results to behavior in ultimatum games and Best Shot games.
Experimental Design
94 students participated in a computerized experiment 3 in June 2001 at the 'ESSE' laboratory at the University of Bari. Students were mainly Economics undergraduates. Experiments lasted 35 minutes and average payoff was 10,000 ITL (≈€5). The pie to be divided was 20,000 ITL.
The experiment consisted of three stages. First, subjects were asked to submit any number between 0 and 100, corresponding to the probability of playing H. 4 Second, subjects were informed that their action determined in stage 1 was their initial action. They were then asked to submit conditional strategies (numbers between 0 and 100) dependent on the action of the partner. Monetary earnings were determined as follows. One of the players in each pair was randomly chosen. Her initial action was recorded, after which her partner's response was derived from his conditional strategy. Next, the first player's response to this response was determined on the basis of her No salient rewards were connected to this choice. Therefore, we will refer to this choice as the subjects' stated preferences while we refer to the second stage choice as revealed preferences.
3 The computer software was developed using Urs Fischbacher's Z-Tree. 4 A random draw, y ∈{1,.., 100} determined whether their action was D or H: let x be the number submitted. If x<y (y≤x) the subject's action was D(H). We are aware that a BDM procedure like the one used here is sometimes considered to be problematic (see, e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993) . We only use it in order to elicit mixed strategies. It turns out that 70% of our subjects submit pure strategies in stage 1, anyway. In stage 2, this is close to 80%. 5 It was explained that a pure strategy choice (i.e., 0 or 100) would determine their responses and final action with certainty. Note that our way of playing out conditional strategies does not make this a repeated game. Figure 2 gives the conditional strategies submitted. 54% of the subjects responded to D with H (chose '100'). 73% chose D in response to H. In both cases, Wilcoxon tests reject the null-hypothesis of equal likelihood of playing H or D. Using the conditional strategies, subjects can be classified into the types distinguished above. 6 53% are classified as M-types, 30% as D; 6% as H and 5% as R. We could not classify the remaining subjects (5%) because they chose to play D and H with equal probability. Note that 83% reply to H with D.
Experimental Results

Stage 2
Figure 2: Conditional Strategies
Furthermore, preferences of the 30% of our subjects that fall into the D-category can only be described by the Fehr& Schmidt model if we extend it to allow for β>α.
We can compare the results to those observed in the literature, for other games. Consider the response to the other player choosing H. Only 11% of our subjects choose H with a probability higher than 50% in this case. This decision is comparable to the response to an ultimatum offer of (3/4,1/4) offer. Therefore, a player concerned about intentions should reject at least as often as in the ultimatum game. We will return to this point in the concluding discussion.
It is also interesting to compare our results with those obtained for the Best Shot game (Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989) . A simple version of the Best Shot game is the following sequential voluntary contribution game: one player moves first and decides whether to make a Low or High contribution. The other person observes the first player's contribution and then decides between a Low or High contribution. The amount of the public good produced is determined by the maximum of the two contributions. The theoretical prediction is that the first mover will choose the Low contribution (zero in a continuous version), thus forcing the second mover to make the High contribution. Experimental evidence for the Best Shot game shows that the theoretical prediction is very accurate; see Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) and Roth (1995) . Another 15% choose D with a probability of at least 50%. Though this is quite supportive of the theoretical (self-interested) prediction, we find a slightly higher level of deviation than in Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) .
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Stage 3 87% of the stated preferences were M-type, 11% were D and 2% were H. No R-type preferences were reported. Hence, a large proportion of stated preferences is explained by the standard selfinterest model. Finally, most subjects who did not choose a materialistic best reply behavior in stage 2 state their preference profile at stage 3 inconsistently with their revealed preferences (most deviate by stating materialistic preferences).
Discussion and Conclusions
The Hawk-Dove game enables us to measure fairness and reciprocity as defined in various models in one experimental set-up. A majority of players in our experiments show materialistic preferences, however. The only other large group plays D in response to either move and may be classified as 'altruists'. Though the response to D with D may be interpreted as positive reciprocity, the fact that these subjects also respond to H with D makes it hard to see their whole preference profile as reciprocal. Moreover, when this group is asked to state their preference orderings at stage 3, most of them revert to materialistic preferences.
Why, then, do our results differ from previous results, which typically find (much) higher levels of reciprocity? The most obvious explanation lies in the game we use. In the Hawk-Dove game, 'cooperative' play (D) does not bring about any Pareto-gains. There are no incentives for subjects who wished to maximize group payoff to cooperate (contrary to the games by Fehr and Gaechter, 2000) . This points to efficiency as opposed to fairness as a leading explanation of behavior observed in other experiments (cf. Charness and Rabin, 2002 , for a model that incorporates both).
This, however, does not explain why subjects behave differently in this game (conditional on observing H) than in the ultimatum game (where fairness is regularly observed to be important). One reason may be that the Hawk-Dove game is more competitive than the classic Ultimatum game. In the latter, a proposer who offers one-half gives the opponent a choice between a (1/2,1/2) and (0,0) division. The second mover is very likely to accept the former since it is both fair and efficient and it gives her the most money. In the Hawk-Dove game, on the other hand, offering one-half means choosing Dove. But a player who chooses D gives the opponent the choice between (1/2,1/2) and
(1/4,3/4). In this case, fairness induces the second mover to choose the first allocation, effic iency has no bite, and money maximization directs him to the second. Suppose an individual's fairness (and efficiency) preference component is equally strong in both games. Then, as soon as the preference for own earnings is sufficiently high, the individual will choose (1/2,1/2) in the Ultimatum game, but
(1/4,3/4) in the Hawk Dove game. In sum, a fair offer in the Ultimatum game is almost sure to be accepted, and is hence almost sure to lead to a balanced (fair) outcome. In the Hawk-Dove game, on the other hand, the Dove action is much less likely to lead to a balanced outcome. In other words: the price of positive reciprocity is higher in the Hawk-Dove game than in the Ultimatum game.
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Respondents realize this and, as a consequence, consider (3/4,1/4) to be a more reasonable offer in the Hawk-Dove game than in the Ultimatum game.
With the results of the conditional choices in stage 2 in mind, we can interpret the observed behavior in stages 1 and 3. In stage 1, D was chosen significantly more often than H. This may be due to the asymmetry in the number of H and D-players. Stage 2 results show that 30% of our subjects play D as a dominant strategy, whereas only 6% play H irrespective of what the other subject plays. As a consequence, even with uninformative priors on the others' preferences, we would expect more D-plays in stage 1.
8 There are alternative explanations. On (due to Schotter and Sopher, 2002) is that expectations about others' fairness are not fulfilled in the ultimatum game (and offers are therefore rejected), whereas subjects do not expect fair behavior in the Hawk-Dove game. Of course, this begs the question why expectations differ in the two games. An alternative explanation lies in the strategy-method used. Brandts and Charness (1998) found that experimental outcomes might vary substantially when playing 'hot' or 'cold' (as here).
In stage 3, stated preferences were predominantly of the M-type (self-interested). This is partly due to the fact that subjects with M-preferences in stage 2 were consistent in reporting the same in stage 3 whereas subjects with other stage 2 preferences often changed when asked to report an ordering in stage 3. We do not wish to dwell too long on these stated preferences results, because this part of the experiment had no financia l incentives. Nevertheless, the difference in consistency for distinct types is noteworthy.
All in all, the extent of reciprocity observed in many other studies does not carry over completely to the strategic environment set by the Hawk-Dove game. This is important because a variety of theories on fairness and reciprocity predict the same outcome for this game, allowing us to test them in a uniform setting. Our results show that the predictive power of each of these theories is dependent on the context in which it is studied.
